Metamorphosis of Islamic Militancy

by Abu Munzir

        Whereas the term of “Islamic militancy” has become a common vocabulary among Americans since September 11, Malaysians have been bombarded with the issue since more than a month ago. There is a need to recognize that “Islamic militancy” does not emerge in a vacuum. Instead, it is the product of certain conditions.

        It must be noted that there is a major distinction between mainstream Islamic groups and groups considered a part of the “Islamic militancy” phenomenon. In every country where there is a mainstream Islamic movement, these movement accept to operate within the democratic and constitutional framework of the country. This is the case with PAS, JIM and ABIM in Malaysia, Jamaat Islami in Pakistan, the Ikhwan Al Muslimin in Jordan, Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, ISNA in the US etc. On the other hand, groups often described as part of the “Islamic militancy” phenomenon tend to be small groups that had in the past been on the fringe.

        If we are to examine the emergence of the “Islamic militant” groups, we can see that quite often it happens after the mainstream Islamic movement has been suppressed. Thus, in Egypt the suppression of the Ikhwan Al Muslimin by the Naser regime lead to the emergence of smaller groups with a radical outlook. One such group is the Takfir Wal Hijrah group. Some believe that the group behind the assasination of Anwar Sadat has its origin from this group. Likewise, the emergence of militant groups in Algeria came after the FIS was denied its election victory.

        In all of these incidents, the ruling regime failed to recognize and accept the role of mainstream Islamic movements. A characteristic of mainstream Islamic movements is the presence of unified command structure lead by a mature leadership committed to democratic processes. This helps instill discipline within the organization. However, once the leaders are detained and the organization suppressed, this command structure breaks down and the organization’s unity unravel. Splinter groups emerge from the pieces that remain free. These groups tend to be characterized by a disillusionment with the democratics process and led by lower level leaders who step in to fill the leadership vaccum created by the suppression of the mainstream Islamic movement. These new leaders do not possess the political sophistication of the detained mainstream leaders. Instead, the experience of being oppressed is more likely to cause them to resort to non-democratic approaches. These leaders cannot be blamed for thinking so for it is the ruling regime that has undermined democracy. Some of these leaders tend to be more radical, and depending on the degree of oppression and state sponsored violence inflicted upon the Islamist, and may begin to see violence as the only response available.

        It is for these reasons that when incidences of violences perpetrated by “Islamic militants” take place, the authorities fail to anticipate it. These are groups,led by otherwise unknown leaders, and tend to be hidden from mainstream development and therefore unmonitored by the state’s security apparatus. It is only when they strike that they become noticed. Even though the Al Maunah is basically a deviant cult, its obscurity ensured that it did not attract the attention of the state’s security apparatus. Thus, nobody anticipated its moves.

        The lesson to be learnt here is that “Islamic militancy” is really the product of a shrinking democratic space. The best strategy to prevent “Islamic militancy” is by not suppressing mainstream Islamic movements. Rather there is the need to engage it in the democratic process. It is in this regard that the recent brouhaha over Islamic militancy in Malaysia must be looked at. There is strong belief that the whole furore was manufactured by the ruling regime to provide justification to ban PAS. If this is indeed the case, the regime is in fact creating the conditions that will actually lead to the birth of “Islamic militancy”.

        It is also in this light that we must be cynical towards Abdullah Badawi’s statement that the ISA is needed to prevent terrorism. Is Badawi suggesting that the Americans could have prevented the September 11 attacks if they had a law similar to ISA? At least in Malaysia, we can see that the ISA was of no use in preventing Al Maunah from committing terror. Likewise, the ISA was of no use in preventing the tragedy in Kampung Medan. And the ISA is definitely of no use in preventing state-sponsored terrorism as was the case in Memali and the KESAS highway.

        Instead, what we see is the use of communism and “Islamic militancy” as a bogey to justify the use of ISA to clampdown on critics and opponents of the regime. Badawi’s statement only confirms the view that authoritarian regimes only know the language of oppression. As Maslow once said, “When the only tool you have is a hammer, you treat everything like a nail”. Likewise, when the only tool you have is the ISA, every critic and opponent becomes a “threat to national security”. If this distorted logic continue to shape the regime’s outlook and behaviour, it will find itself having to bear the consequences of its oppressive methods. Oppression is the midwife of  militancy, whether it is “Islamic militancy”, “Catholic militancy”, “Tamil militancy” or “Kurdish militancy”.

        The ruling regime must recognize that it is solely responsible for sowing the seeds of disaster if it continues to suppress dissent and undermine democracy. By manufacturing the KMM (Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia or Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, whichever is the flavour of the day in the local media) bogey, it is playing with fire. When you play with fire too often, you are bound to get burned.