The conviction of Anwar Ibrahim in the courtroom of Augustine Paul is relevant. It is relevant to the defendant, and it is relevant to the defendant's family. It is relevant to the defense attorneys, and it is relevant to the judiciary process in Malaysia. It is relevant to the Umno party, struggling to survive in it's aftermath.

The conviction was affirmed on appeal by a panel of three judges, giving an insightful description of their deliberations. The first half of their written opinion contains excerpts from the transcript of the trial, and extensive citations supporting their agreement with the trial judge. But the last half of their twenty plus pages lets the reader view their depth of mind as they deliberate, delving deeply into the intricacies of case law and displaying a homespun variety of juridical ingenuity.

The lay reader begins to glimpse the tenor and tone of the appeal by page seven, where the judges write, "But Raja Aziz [defence counsel] informed the court that the prosecution had already brought in such evidence as for example that sodomy had taken place by producing a mattress with seminal stains on it supported by the Chemist's testimony."

The defence objected to the late stage changes in the charges, shifting the trial from alleged sex offences to abuse of power.

In supporting their opinion that making these amendments was not unfair to the defendant, the appellate judges write, "After having scrutinized the charges we are in complete agreement with 
the learned Judge below that the reason for making the amendment was to avoid duplicity and not as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, in that the prosecution at the end of its case 
could not prove the charges and so the application for amendment was made."

One notes with dismay the appearance of a mental lapse, one in a series, in which the appellate judges are concerned with the reason behind the amendment, rather than the objection raised by the defence, that such amendments operate to the disadvantage of the accused. The consequence, of course, is that the judges appear more interested in protecting the decisions of the trial judge than 
examining the transcript for errors of procedure prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. The pattern is repeated throughout.

To the lay reader the rest of the opinion contains an uninterrupted series of judicial errors, almost one per paragraph, which will are sure to become the subject of subsequent conjecture, and having made 
this observation, one feels constrained to give detailed analysis in depth in support of the allegation, and this will be made available forthwith.

The decision of the appellate court to affirm the conviction turns on two minor, but all important points. The first is the charge that the defendant gave instructions to two Special Branch policemen to obtain retractions of letters. The defence denied that any such request was made, stating that the nature of the discussions were based on discovering the identity of the letter writers, and to determine, if possible, what role they were playing in the ongoing attempt to discredit the defendant. There was no clear evidence that a request for assistance was ever offered, the defendant stating that the offer was indeed made by the two policemen, having been sent for the purpose by the Inspector General of Police.

The defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt in this matter, and the appellate court denies him this right. There is no preponderance of evidence, in fact there is only the inconsistent testimony of 
the two policeman. The appellate court prefers to misconstrue the role of the police officers in a manner detrimental to the defendant, thus casting doubt on their legal training, experience and independence. These are all relevant to the deterioration of public confidence in the judiciary in Malaysia.

The second crucial point upon which the conviction is affirmed is the context in which the term "gempar" was used in conversation between the accused and the two policemen. The defence readily admitted that this term was used, but only in the context of protecting the letter writers from overly reacting to the investigations of the officers. "Don't gempar them too much," was the admonition of the 
defendant, which in the light of his character and his history of kindness and compassion is certainly in keeping with public expectations. The appeal court chose to construe the term in the most disadvantageous light possible, even introducing conjecture and supposition into the trial transcript where none appeared before.

The two policemen, it must be noted, were at all times under the supervision of the Inspector General of Police, who entered a plea of guilty to charges of assaulting the defendant while in police custody, handcuffed and blindfolded. [He is thus liable for civil damages to the defendant]. The fact that the assailant, even after a guilty plea, has not served one day of the sentence imposed, continues to cast doubt as to the credibility of the two police witnesses. The police sent armed officers in balaclavas to the house of the defendant in the middle of the night, with every appearance of precipitating an incident that would justify shooting him "in the attempt to escape." Other units of the police shot eleven "suspects" in the head on the nights of October 2nd and 3rd, just two weeks later, and these policemen were also under the direction of the Inspector General. On the basis of available evidence, it must be observed that, on balance, the defendant is lucky he survived the arrest, and thus far, his cruel and unusual detention.

On these two tiny, tenuous threads then, a man was condemned to long servitude in solitary confinement. In justification of affirming the severity of the stern sentence the appellate judges state, "In view of the standing and position of the appellant in the present appeal, we do not think the same consideration [argument in mitigation] as was given in those two earlier cases [cited] be given to the appellant." The judges seem to relate the sentence to the "standing and position of the appellant," which clearly contravenes the primary dictum of the law, "All men are created equal."

Legal opinions are public property, and the failings of judges are not protected. Once delivered, their judgments are open to fair comment by anyone in the world. Judges are presumed to give their best in writing their opinions, and as such, must be prepared to face the evaluation of the ages. In Malaysia the Constitution prohibits comment or discussion relative to the conduct of judges inside the houses of Parliament. There is no refuge from folly in the wider world. Though the intent is to condemn the accused, the opinion in this case clearly indicts the biased judiciary charged with protecting our rights. In effect then, these judges have condemned not the prisoner, but themselves.

We must apply ourselves to the righting of these, and other, wrongs. Nothing is more important.